A prototype is not enough
Europe loves innovation while it is still a project: a grant, a laboratory, a successful demonstration. Much less so when it must become an order, a production line and a risk shared by the buyer. The result is a paradox: public money can fund the beginning, while demand often fails to support the hardest transition, from prototype to market.
The proposed European Industrial Accelerator Act tries to shift the focus. Presented by the Commission on 4 March 2026, it introduces European-origin and low-carbon criteria in public procurement and support schemes for strategic sectors. On 22 September, Reuters highlighted the scale of this leverage: EU public procurement is worth more than two trillion euros, around 14% of the European economy. The measure is not yet law: Parliament and national governments still have to agree on the final text.
Purchasing can be industrial policy
The intuition is sound: a company does not scale because it receives applause, but because it finds customers. For batteries, heat pumps, low-carbon materials or industrial components, a public buyer can create the first demand large and predictable enough to justify factories, skills and suppliers. The OECD notes that public procurement, when used strategically, can stimulate innovation and productivity; it also warns that relying solely on the lowest price obstructs more ambitious goals.
This does not mean that every European product deserves protection. An origin requirement can support industrial capacity, but it can also reduce competition, raise costs or reward a mediocre offer. Reported divisions among member states, together with exemptions when products are unavailable or switching suppliers becomes too costly, show that this is not a theoretical boundary. It is the issue lawmakers still have to settle.
Demand must become informed
FRONTIERA's position is that the real leap is not simply to “buy European,” but to learn how to buy innovation. That means describing the problem to solve instead of prescribing the technology in advance, assessing performance and costs over the full life cycle, providing for field trials and making contracts accessible to smaller companies too. These are editorial and industrial-policy principles, not a description of a model that has already been perfected.
Imagine, as a hypothetical example, that a hospital asks for a system capable of reducing energy use and maintenance time instead of ordering the device specified in a five-year-old tender document. Or that a city purchases a measurable mobility service while leaving room for solutions that are not yet dominant. In such cases, the buyer does not choose a winner by nationality: it creates a paid, verifiable and repeatable trial.
The opposite risk is to use the “Made in EU” label as a substitute for quality. That would be an expensive shortcut. Industrial sovereignty does not mean buying anything produced within a border; it means enabling suppliers that can also compete beyond that border. Europe therefore needs fewer ceremonies devoted to prototypes and more informed customers willing to measure what they buy. The future of an innovation begins when someone signs the first order; industrial policy should make that order demanding, not easy.
